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In October 2005, the Russian trawler ‘Elektron’ refused to be subjected to arrest 
when caught by the Norwegian Coast Guard for illegal fishing in the Fisheries 
Protection Zone off the Svalbard archipelago. With two Norwegian Coast Guard 
inspectors still on board, the trawler took off from its pursuers, heading for Russian 
territorial waters. Observers in Russia were outraged by the attempted arrest and 
called for the Northern Fleet to flex its muscles as the hot pursuit in the Barents Sea 
unfolded. The purpose of this article is to explore the underlying factors that may 
explain Russia’s non-escalatory behavior during the incident and why the issue was 
not ‘securitized’ by the Russian political establishment. The article is to be read as a 
case study exploring the phenomenon of ‘failed securitization’. On a more policy-
oriented level, the article also aims to shed light on Russian policies and perceptions 
with regard to the role, relevance, and usefulness of military power in the European 
Arctic, as well as the interplay between intra- and interstate security dynamics.  
 
Introduction 
 
The Barents Sea has historically been, and still is, an important meeting place for 
Russian and Norwegian security and economic interests. It is the Russian Northern 
Fleet’s primary area of transit to and from the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans, and it is 
rich in living marine resources as well as oil and natural gas. The marine resources of 
the Barents Sea, among which the Northeast Atlantic cod stock holds a special place, 
are of great economic importance to both Russia and Norway. The two countries are 
therefore presumed to be willing to go to great lengths to defend their economic 
interests in the region, if necessary by the use of naval force. Lingering disagreements 
over maritime borders and the legal status of maritime areas have so far not lead to 
open confrontations between the coast guard or naval forces of Russia and Norway.1 
On the other hand, neither of the countries seems to exclude the theoretical possibility 
of such a development in the event of an unacceptable infringement on their national 
sovereignty or sovereign rights, which are perceived differently in the two countries.  
 
In the case of the ‘Elektron’, the roots of the episode and the subsequent diplomatic 
exchanges are to be found in the two countries’ differing views on the legal status of 
the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone. The Fisheries Protection Zone is a 200-mile 
non-discriminatory fisheries jurisdiction zone around the Svalbard archipelago, 
established by the Norwegian Government in 1977. In accordance with the Svalbard 
Treaty of 1920, Norway exercises full and absolute sovereignty over the archipelago 
and holds the position that it has the right under the modern law of the sea to exercise 
and enforce fisheries jurisdiction in the Zone. However, at the establishment of the 
Zone, the Soviet Union argued that Norway did not have the right to take such a 
measure unilaterally. This is also the position of the Russian Federation at the present 
day (Barsegov, 2002: 34–35). Still, the Norwegian control and enforcement measures 
in the Zone, which are said to be based on objective conservation and management 
                                                 
1 In Norway, the Coast Guard is part of the Navy, but has separate vessels.  
 needs, have generally been complied with in practice by other nations, including 
Russia.  
 
Well aware of the position of Russia and other nations with regard to the legal status 
of the Zone, Norway has been disinclined to penalize violators in the Zone, at least in 
cases of minor violations. Throughout the 2000s, however, the problem of illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing threatened to undermine fish stocks in the 
region as well as the joint Norwegian-Russian management regime in the Barents Sea, 
and tougher measures were taken by the Norwegian Coast Guard. In April 2001, the 
Russian trawler ‘Chernigov’ was arrested by the Norwegian Coast Guard in the 
Svalbard Zone and escorted to Tromsø on the Norwegian mainland, where the captain 
was charged with grave violations of fishery regulations. This was the first time such 
a measure had been taken vis-à-vis a Russian fishing vessel in the Zone.  
 
The ‘Chernigov’ arrest provoked strong reactions in Russia, in the form of a protest 
note from the Russian Foreign Ministry, and a threat from the Chairman of the 
Russian State Fisheries Committee, Yevgeniy Nazdratenko, that the Russian Navy 
would ‘shoot at and sink’ Norwegian Coast Guard vessels in the Svalbard Zone if 
they ever did the same again (Hønneland, 2003: 66). A few months later, the Northern 
Fleet deployed the 535-foot destroyer ‘Severomorsk’ to the Svalbard Zone for a ten-
day period, reportedly to ‘protect Russian fishing vessels from the Norwegian Coast 
Guard’ (Getmanskiy et al. 2002). This rare Russian show of force was apparently 
meant to send a signal to political decision-makers in Norway. Thus, when Norway 
four and a half years later again attempted to arrest a Russian trawler in the Svalbard 
Zone, there where many uncertainties with regard to how Russia would react. 
 
In order to get a better understanding of the dynamics at play on the Russian side 
during the ‘Elektron’ incident, we will first outline a model for how interstate disputes 
such as the one discussed in this article may become politicized and securitized. This 
is done in the section below, which draws on and discusses the Copenhagen School 
framework. The case of the study is then presented and examined in greater detail in 
the following section. Thereafter follows an analysis of internal and external factors 
that may explain why the incident did not become securitized in Russia. Findings 
from the case analysis are summarized and elaborated on in the concluding section.  
 
Securitization, Desecuritization, and Non-Securitization 
 
There are many ways to approach the topic of security policy decision-making during 
interstate disputes. This study draws heavily on securitization theory, as outlined by 
the Copenhagen School2 of security studies (Buzan et al., 1998). Securitization theory 
can help us understand why and how certain issues become security issues, while 
others remain outside the sphere of security politics. Why and how do issues such as 
fishery disputes escalate and de-escalate, and how they are dealt with at the different 
levels? Who are the actors that call for extraordinary measures such as the display or 
use of military force? What do they do, and whom do they approach, to achieve their 
objectives? And what are the factors that determine whether they succeed or fail?  
                                                 
2 The term ‘Copenhagen school’ was first used by Bill McSweeney (McSweeney, 1996) in reference to 
the theoretical work being done at the time by a group of researchers associated the Center for Peace 
and Conflict Research, established in 1985 and later renamed Copenhagen Peace Research Institute 
(COPRI). Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde are seen as the ‘school’s’ main contributors. 
  
According to the Copenhagen School, the escalation process typically starts with an 
issue being placed on the political agenda of one or both of the disputing parties 
(presuming that the issue in question is a dyadic interstate dispute), in other words an 
issue being politicized. If it later turns out that it does no longer require the attention 
of politicians, it may become depoliticized. On the other hand, if the issue in question 
reaches a point where it is considered to constitute an existential threat to a referent 
object, and requiring extraordinary measures such as the threat, display, or use of 
military force, it may become securitized, that is, placed on the security agenda.  
 
Securitization is described as ‘a more extreme version of politicization’ (Buzan et al., 
1998: 23). Securitized issues may remain on the security agenda for a long period of 
time, before eventually being desecuritized and brought back to the sphere of ‘normal 
politics’ (ibid.: 27, 39). Desecuritization typically takes place when the threat that led 
to the securitization is perceived to have disappeared or become ‘non-existential’. 
Actors may also deliberately choose to refrain from describing certain issues in terms 
of security, and instead try to handle them outside the sphere of ‘panic politics’.  
 
Non-politicized
Politcized
Securitized
Depoliticization
Desecuritization
Time
Le
ve
lo
fi
nt
en
si
ty
 
Figure 1: The Life Cycle of an Interstate Dispute. 
 
The steps from non-politicized to securitized, which we have sought to illustrate in 
figure 1, are summed up by Barry Buzan in his article ‘Rethinking Security after the 
Cold War’ (Buzan, 1997: 14):  
 
In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized 
(meaning that the state doesn’t deal with it, and it is not in any other way made an issue of 
public debate and decision); through politicized (meaning that the issue is part of public 
policy, requiring government decision and resources allocations or more rarely some other 
form of communal governance); to securitized (meaning that the issue is presented as an 
existential threat requiring emergency measures, and justifying actions outside the normal 
bounds of political procedure). In principle, the placement of issues in this spectrum is open: 
depending on circumstances, any issue can end up on any part of the spectrum. 
 
Our use of the term ‘escalation’ may need to be qualified. Rather than describing a 
slow and incremental movement from the political sphere into the security sphere, 
securitization theory is about qualitative ‘jumps’ between specific orderings of 
 political relations, or, if you like, sudden changes in the ‘rules of the game’.3 The 
essence of securitization theory is that security is a ‘speech act’4 whereby ‘a state 
representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims 
a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it’ (Wæver, 1995: 55).  
 
In order for the ‘securitizing move’5 to be successful, the ‘securitizing actor(s)’6 
need(s) to have a certain authority in the eyes of the ‘audience’7, and the alleged 
threat needs to be perceived as existential. Successful securitization can, in other 
words, be understood as ‘the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with 
a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects’ (Buzan, 1997: 14). The 
‘intersubjectivity’ dimension, and how to understand the nature of actor–audience 
interaction, has been a central topic in recent debates relating to the theory. Second-
generation contributors such as Thierry Balzacq and Holger Stritzel (Balzacq, 2005; 
Stritzel, 2007) have criticized the theory for putting too much weight on the 
formal/semantic side of security speech acts at the expense of their social context and 
the pragmatic dimensions of actor–audience interaction. Balzacq argues that 
 
securitization is better understood a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as 
part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural 
disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the 
interaction (Balzacq, 2005:  172). 
 
While it may be argued that securitization theory was originally conceived as an 
internalist theory (Stritzel, 2007: 367), the externalist perspective is by no means 
absent from Wæver and Buzan’s framework, or for that matter J. L. Austin’s speech 
act theory. Central in this regard is the concept of ‘facilitating conditions’. In order for 
a security speech act to succeed in convincing a ‘significant audience’, it needs to be 
undertaken in accordance with the ‘grammar of security’ by an actor in a (not 
necessarily official) ‘position of authority’, under a set of circumstances prone to 
facilitate the successful completion of the act (Buzan et al., 1998: 32–33, cf. Austin 
1962: 14–15). Wæver does, however, emphasize that ‘even very important conditions 
for successful securitization can never replace the political act as such’ (Wæver, 2000: 
252). 
 
According to Balzacq, successful security speech acts are ‘audience-centered’, 
‘context-dependent’, and ‘power-laden’ (Balzacq, 2005: 171). In a somewhat similar 
manner, Strizel has suggested ways to draw the audience more coherently into the 
Copenhagen School framework, by introducing an ‘internalist/externalist’ distinction 
(Strizel, 2007: 377). Others who have problematized the speech act approach have 
drawn attention to the phenomenon of ‘visual securitization’ and the use of images 
(Williams, 2003; Hansen, 2007; McDonald, 2008). Hansen (2000) has also raised the 
issue of ‘silencing’ and warned against ignoring the ‘voiceless’, that is, those 
considered illegitimate to speak security on behalf of a particular collective. 
 
Whereas the case of Lene Hansen’s ‘Mermaid’ article (the honor killings of women in 
Pakistan) may have little in common with the case of this study (the pursuit of a 
                                                 
3 We owe this point to one of the anonymous reviewers. 
4 This term is, as Wæver points out, adopted from the British language philosopher John L. Austin. 
5 The act of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object (Buzan et al., 1998: 25). 
6 The one(s) who makes the argument about the existence of an existential threat (ibid.: 40) 
7 Those who approve or reject the securitizing move (ibid.: 41). 
 Russian fishing trawler in the Barents Sea), her findings are not without relevance to 
analyses of security dynamics within other sectors than the societal. Security speech 
acts may – for various reasons – misfire at the launch pad, and issues may remain 
‘non-securitized’. Whereas successful instances of securitization can be explained, in 
part, by the presence of ‘facilitating conditions’, or to use Balzacq’s phrase, ‘a nexus 
of congruent forces’ (Balzacq, 2005: 193), the causes of unsuccessful instances of 
securitization have to be sought, in part, in the lack – or incongruence – of 
‘facilitation conditions’.8 Seen from a theoretical perspective, case studies of ‘failed 
securitization’ are not necessarily less useful or less intriguing than case studies of 
‘successful’ securitization, which have so far dominated the research literature.  
 
The ‘Elektron’ Incident: Hot Pursuit and Cool-Headed Politicians 
  
Before we turn to the ‘Elektron’ case, we would like to introduce the topic of 
interstate fishery disputes. There are many examples of fishery-related disputes and 
rivalries having been placed on the security agenda of states, often in a ‘dyadic’ 
pattern. Frequently cited examples of so-called ‘fish wars’ are the British-Icelandic 
‘cod wars’ in the North Atlantic (1958-61, 1973-73, and 1975-76), the Norwegian-
Icelandic dispute over fisheries in the Svalbard Zone (1994), and the Canadian-
Spanish/EU ‘turbot war’ on the Grand Banks off Newfoundland (1995) (Welch, 2006; 
Kristensen, 2005; Desombre, 2000). Fishery-related disputes are common also in the 
coastal waters of Southeast Asia (see Pomeroy et al., 2007). In the North Pacific, 
Russia and Japan have had a long-standing dispute over fishing rights in the waters 
around the disputed Kurile Islands, occasionally leading to the use of military force.9  
 
All of the incidents listed above included various ‘emergency measures’ being 
undertaken in the name of a state against fishing vessels of another state, whether it be 
warning shots, trawls cuttings, seizure of ships and/or crews, deliberate rammings, or 
live fire aimed at the hull of fishing vessels. It should be noted, however, that fishery-
related disputes rarely escalate to the level of sinking of ships and loss of life. This is 
not to say that there is no potential for escalation of such disputes. If a fishing vessel – 
with or without the backing of its flag state – refuses to abide by instructions given by 
the official forces10 of a coastal state and tries to escape punishment by fleeing, the 
coastal state may decide to resort to the use of force. The coastal state may under 
certain circumstances also extend its jurisdiction onto the high seas to seize the vessel.  
 
The coastal state’s right of ‘hot pursuit’ (see Poulantzas, 2002; Shaw, 1997: 424–
425), which is elaborated on in the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea 
(article 111) as well the 1958 High Seas Convention (article 23), ceases only when the 
ship pursued has entered the territorial waters of its own or a third state. If the flag 
state does not recognize the coastal state’s right of hot pursuit, it may attempt to 
convince (or deter) it to abort the pursuit – by diplomatic means, or by the threat, 
display, or use of force against the pursuers.  
 
                                                 
8 Illustrative in this regard is Ole Wæver’s analysis of the circumstances surrounding the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989 (Wæver, 1995: 60–61). 
9 In 2006, a Japanese fisherman was shot and killed when a Russian patrol boat opened fire on a 
Japanese fishing schooner near Kaigara Island of the Southern Kuriles (RFE/RL, 2006). 
10 Typically Coast Guard or Navy vessels, maritime patrol aircraft, or helicopters. 
 The underlying factors that led to the four-day ‘cat and mouse’ game in the Barents 
Sea in October 2005 –  the Norwegian-Russian disagreement over the legal status of 
the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone, and the problem of IUU fishing in northern 
waters – had been politicized for quite some time in both Norway and Russia when 
the ‘Elektron’ took center stage. The Russian trawler had been on the list of suspected 
environmental and fisheries law violators of the Norwegian as well as the Russian 
Coast Guard for a long period of time. During the October inspection, the Norwegian 
Coast Guard inspectors found what they perceived to be conclusive evidence of 
extensive IUU fishing. When the Norwegians decided to arrest the trawler, there was 
a potential risk that the dispute could become securitized by Russian decision-makers. 
 
The captain of the ‘Elektron’, Valery Yarantsev, strongly objected to being arrested. 
He claimed that the Norwegian Coast Guard had no right to detain Russian trawlers in 
the Svalbard Zone, and that his activities there should be regulated by Russian, rather 
than by Norwegian, fisheries law (Bigg, 2005). The trawler was instructed to follow 
the Norwegian Coast Guard cutter ‘KV Tromsø’ to the port of Tromsø for criminal 
proceedings, and two Norwegian Coast Guard inspectors were placed on board the 
trawler in order to ensure a safe leg back to the Norwegian mainland.  
 
On the second day of the operation, Sunday 16 October, events suddenly took an 
unexpected turn when Yarantsev, acting in agreement with the vessel’s owners in 
Murmansk (Gazeta, 2005), decided to break away from the Norwegian convoy and 
set course for the Kola Peninsula and Russian territorial waters. ‘KV Tromsø’ turned 
after the trawler, and started chasing it through the Barents Sea in stormy weather and 
30-foot waves. Assistance was rendered by three other Coast Guard vessels11, as well 
as by two Coast Guard helicopters, and a maritime patrol aircraft. The pursuit 
continued through the Barents Sea ‘Loophole’12 and into Russian economic zone.  
 
It did not take long for the drama in the Barents Sea to reach national news media in 
both Norway and Russia. Speculations abounded in Norway as to what one might or 
should do in order to prevent the trawler from escaping. In Russia, reactions centered 
on the alleged ‘heavy-handedness’ of the Norwegian Coast Guard, particularly those 
coming from central actors within the Russian fisheries complex (Regnum, 2005b). 
Meanwhile, the commander of the Regional Defense Command in Northern Norway 
maintained close contact with the commander of the Russian Northern Fleet, in an 
effort to avoid further escalation of the situation. Simultaneously, the commander of 
the Norwegian Coast Guard stayed in close contact with his Russian counterpart via 
telephone. Consultations were also continuous at the diplomatic/political level.  
 
The contents of the political and military dialogue that took place during the critical 
days of the ‘Elektron’ incident are difficult to ascertain, due to the classification of 
records. However, what can be delved into is what course of action different actors on 
the Russian side were advocating at the time, what (if any) efforts were made at 
different levels to securitize the issue, and what (if any) calls were made for 
‘emergency measures’ such as the threat, display, or use of military force.  
 
                                                 
11 ‘KV Svalbard’, ‘KV Harstad’, and ‘KV Nordkapp’. 
12 The ‘Loophole’ is a pocket of international waters in the central part of Barents Sea, surrounded by 
the Exclusive Economic Zones of Norway and Russia, and the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone.   
 Not surprisingly, the strongest reactions to the attempted arrest of the ‘Elektron’, and 
the most explicit calls for extraordinary measures such as the involvement of the 
Russian Northern Fleet, seem to have come from the Fishery Industry Union of the 
North, whose headquarters are located in Murmansk. The Union’s Director General, 
Gennadii Stepakhno, defied all allegations against the ‘Elektron’, and described the 
actions of the Norwegian Coast Guard as ‘provocative and unlawful’ (Gazeta, 2005). 
He stated that the Russian Navy ought to protect the Union’s members and their 
vessels, which were exercising their right to fish in the Russian Economic Zone and 
‘the international fishing areas’ off the Svalbard archipelago (Regnum, 2005b). In an 
interview with Ekho Moskvy on 18 October, Deputy Department Head Vadim 
Sokolov of the Murmansk Regional Government characterized the attempted arrest of 
the ‘Elektron’ as ‘an attack on Russian sovereignty’ (Denisova, 2005). 
 
Efforts to frame the ‘Elektron’ incident as a national security issue were also made at 
the federal level. But they were few and far between. The Head of the Russian 
Fisheries Directorate, Stanislav Ilyasov, described the Norwegian Coast Guard’s 
measures vis-à-vis the Elektron and other Russian trawlers in the Svalbard Zone as 
acts of ‘terrorism and aggression’ (Regnum, 2005c). In the Russian Duma, ultra-
nationalist and LDPR party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, adamantly on the trawler 
captain’s side, proposed, as a tit-for-tat measure, to hold ’war games’ in the Barents 
Sea to make the Norwegians back off (Duchovny, 2005). Retired naval officers such 
as Vice Admiral Eduard Baltin spoke nostalgically about the days when Russian 
fishing vessels were accompanied by Russian naval vessels in near and distant waters, 
implicitly suggesting that the underlying reason for the drama in the Barents Sea was 
to be found in the Northern Fleet’s fall from grace in the post-Cold War period: 
 
Up to the beginning of the 1990s, Russian patrol vessels regularly patrolled the Spitsbergen 
[Svalbard] region, and no arrests of Russian fishing vessels took place. Today, our Fleet is 
weak, and the weak, as you know, gets beaten (Solov’ev & Ivanov, 2005).   
 
The Norwegian Ministry of Defense, on its part, stressed that the pursuers had 
exercised a high degree of caution in its efforts to stop the ‘Elektron’. It was later 
reported, however, that there had been Norwegian plans to board the ‘Elektron’ with 
helicopter-borne Special Forces. These plans were reportedly called off in the last 
minute due to the severe weather conditions in the Barents Sea and the long flying 
distance between the Norwegian mainland and the operation area (Dagbladet, 2006). 
The Norwegian Defense Ministry later emphasized that Norway’s handling of the 
incident had been dictated by weather-related safety concerns rather than political 
concerns (Ministry of Defense, 2005). Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre reiterated 
this claim, stating that ‘there was never any doubt that Norwegian authorities were 
intent on bringing it to a Norwegian harbor’. He added that ‘only operational 
considerations prevented the forced boarding of the trawler’ (Stortinget, 2006). 
 
Reports in Russian news media at the time of the pursuit were both anti-Norwegian 
and strongly biased in favor of Yarantsev. They described in colorful terms how the 
captain stood up to the attacking varyagy,13 who allegedly had dropped ‘incendiary 
bombs’ to bring his vessel to a halt. It was also reported that ‘KV Tromsø’ had 
immobilized another Russian trawler, the ‘Grigoriy Arlashkin’, with a kapron net 
                                                 
13 This Russian term refers originally to the Scandinavian ‘Varangians’ who traveled eastwards into 
Kievan Rus’ in the Viking Age, promoting trade, piracy, and mercenary militarism. 
 when the latter vessel had made an effort to shield the ‘Elektron’ from its pursuers. 
Neither of this was true. Signal flares had apparently been mistaken for incendiary 
bombs, willingly or unwillingly, and the Norwegian Coast Guard categorically denied 
any involvement in the immobilization of the ‘Grigoriy Arlashkin’ (Belusov, 2005). 
 
In view of the way the incident was presented in Russian news media at the time of 
the pursuit, it may not come as a surprise that a majority of the Russian population 
was favorably disposed towards Yarantsev and his actions. According to a nation-
wide opinion poll published shortly after the incident, 43 percent of Russians were of 
the opinion that Yarantsev had ‘done the right thing’ by fleeing from the Norwegians, 
whereas only 13 percent held the opposite opinion (Shmerlina, 2005). Interestingly, 
this view contrasts sharply with statements made by representatives of the Murmansk 
branch of the Federal Security Service (FSB) during the operation. On October 18, 
the chief of the Murmansk region’s border department, Major-General Viktor 
Gubenko, stated in an interview with Itar-Tass that ‘the actions by Norwegian Coast 
Guard vessels to detain the trawler do not contradict international legal norms’. He 
added that Yarantsev’s actions, both during the detention in the fishing area and later 
in the ‘neutral’ waters of the Barents Sea ‘defy logical explanation’ (Itar-Tass, 2005).  
 
In a similar manner, the leadership of the Russian Navy did everything in its power to 
tone down the national security aspect of the incident and consistently maintained its 
unwillingness to take measures to protect the ‘Elektron’ from its Norwegian pursuers. 
Much to the disappointment of hard-line derzhavniks,14 the Navy’s chief press 
official, Captain Igor Dygalo, let the press know at an early stage that ‘the Russian 
Navy will not get involved in the events surrounding the trawler “Elektron”’ 
(Regnum, 2005b). The Navy did, however, as a routine measure, dispatch the 
Northern Fleet’s Udaloy-class destroyer ‘Admiral Levchenko’ to the outer boundary 
of Russia’s sea territory to make sure that the Norwegian pursuers did not enter into 
Russian territorial waters, and to continue the escort of the ‘Elektron’ towards 
Murmansk (Konovalov, 2005).  
 
The restraint shown by the Russian Navy and FSB Border Guards was largely in line 
with political signals coming from Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov throughout the 
four-day pursuit. He emphasized that the incident did not represent a ‘threat’ to 
Russian-Norwegian relations (Konovalov, 2005), and that there was ‘no danger of 
armed conflict’ between the two countries (Nurnberg, 2005). In the morning of 
Wednesday, 19 October, the ‘Elektron’ crossed into Russian territorial waters, and the 
Norwegian Coast Guard vessels aborted their pursuit. At this point, the two 
Norwegian ‘hostages’ were still aboard the Russian trawler, and the ‘KV Tromsø’ 
continued to follow the movement of the ‘Elektron’ on a course parallel to the 
Russian territorial line (Belusov, 2005).  
 
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, FSB General Viktor Gubenko, and Russian Navy 
spokesman Igor Dygalo consistently emphasized the need for a diplomatic solution of 
the dispute and referred in this regard to on-going bilateral consultations at the 
Foreign Ministers level. Foreign Minister Støre stated that there was no conflict 
between the two countries, thus making a distinction between the runaway trawler 
and the Russian state. His Russian counterpart, Foreign Minister Lavrov, recognized 
                                                 
14 Advocates of a strong and powerful Russian state, or if you will, ‘great power’ champions. 
 the ‘crisis’ nature of the situation and made it clear that Russia had never agreed to 
the parameters of the Svalbard Zone, which in his view had been established by 
Norway in an ‘unilateral’ manner. Still, he stated that there was mutual understanding 
between the two countries that the situation with the ‘Elektron’ would have to be 
‘resolved through negotiations’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005).  
 
As the trawler approached Russia’s territorial boundary, it was agreed that the two 
‘kidnapped’ Norwegian Coast Guard inspectors would be transferred to their mother 
ship by a Russian border patrol vessel – the ‘Tver’. The latter vessel also escorted the 
‘Elektron’ into the port of Murmansk, where it docked on the evening of 20 October, 
five days after the Norwegian attempt to arrest it in the Svalbard Fisheries Protection 
Zone. The Russian newspaper Gazeta reported the same day that ‘the war with 
Norway has been called off’ (Zorin & Smirnov, 2005).  
 
Shortly after, evidence material from the Norwegian Coast Guard pertaining to the 
‘Elektron’ incident was submitted to the Russian authorities. In the following months, 
further investigation was undertaken by the Russian side, eventually leading to a 
100,000 ruble penalty for illegal fishing. Yarantsev was, however, acquitted of 
charges of kidnapping (BarentsObserver, 2007).  
 
Why Did Securitization of the ‘Elektron’ Incident Fail? 
 
Statements made by prominent representatives of the Russian fishery complex on the 
day of the arrest and throughout the four-day pursuit, containing implicit and explicit 
calls for emergency measures such as the threat, display and use of naval force, may 
in our view be seen as examples of security speech acts. The same can be said about 
LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy’s call for a Russian response in the form of ‘war 
games’ in the Barents Sea, and analogous appeals by (mainly retired) naval officers. 
But neither of these moves led to a securitization of the issue. If what we have is a 
case of ‘failed securitization’, it would be interesting to find out why the seeds of 
securitization fell on stony ground. Was it (1) because the securitizing actors did not 
follow the ‘grammar of security’, that is, failed to construct ‘a plot with existential 
threat, point of no return and a possible way out’? Was it (2) because the securitizing 
actors did not have ‘the social capital of the enunciator’? Or was it (3) because of (the 
lack of) ‘conditions historically associated with the threat’ (Wæver 2003: 15–16)?  
 
Obviously, the three explanations outlined above are not mutually exclusive, and the 
answer to our question may well be found in the combination of two or all of them. 
Still, for purposes of clarity, we will explore them one by one, since they highlight 
different aspects of the intersubjective process during which the existence of an 
existential threat is recognized, and emergency measures legitimized.  
 
The Copenhagen School concept of ‘facilitating conditions’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 32), 
which is a derivate of J. L. Austin’s concept of ‘felicity conditions’ in the field of 
speech act theory (Austin, 1962: 14–15), aims at capturing internal as well as external 
conditions for the successful completion of a security speech act. The theory may also 
help us understand when, why, and how security speech acts fail. In the case of the 
‘Elektron’, the first of the three explanations outlined above relates primarily to the 
securitizing move (the use of language). The second relates to the securitizing actors’ 
relationship with an audience (the social dimension). The third explanation relates to 
 more or less specific features of the alleged threat (such as its historical pretext, or 
lack thereof) which either facilitated or impeded securitization.  
 
The content of security speech acts in Russia in conjunction with the pursuit of the 
‘Elektron’ (see table 1) centered on Russia’s right to conduct fisheries in the waters 
outside the Svalbard archipelago. The attempted arrest of the Russian trawler was, as 
noted above, framed by prominent representatives of the Russian fishery complex as 
an unacceptable infringement on the principle of the freedom of the seas and threat to 
Russia’s economic interests in the region. This claim was made against the 
background of Russia’s declared non-acceptance of Norway’s right to enforce 
fisheries jurisdiction in the Svalbard Zone, and it was coupled with accusations that 
Norway was pursuing a strategy of undermining Russian economic activities also on 
the archipelago itself (Pomortsev, 2005).  
 
By attempting to ‘force’ Russia out of the Svalbard region through the adoption and 
enforcement of strict environmental legislation, Norway had allegedly created a 
situation in which Russian counter-measures should be considered.15 ‘Sooner or later, 
Russia [will] have to go to war against Norway for the Barents Sea’, noted a reporter 
in the New Times journal, in reference to those who believed that it was time to ‘show 
the Norwegians the might of Russian arms’ (Prokhorov, 2006: 38).  
 
Securitizing actors (who made 
the claims about the existence 
of existential threats?) 
Captain Yarantsev, representatives of the Russian 
fishery complex, elements within the ‘power 
ministries’, right-wing hardliners in the Duma 
Audiences (who needed to be 
convinced about the existence 
of existential threats?) 
The Foreign Ministry, the Federal Security Service 
(FSB), the Defense Ministry, the Commander-in-
Chief of the Russian Navy, the Russian public 
Object of threats (what was 
claimed to be threatened?) 
The safety of the ‘Elektron’ and its crew, Russia’s 
economic interests in the region, the principle of 
freedom of the seas, Russian sovereignty 
Subject of threats (what was 
claimed to be threatening?) 
Norway’s regulatory and enforcement measures in 
the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone, the use of 
force against Russian trawlers 
Suggested ‘emergency 
measures’ (what counter 
measures were advocated?) 
Gunboat diplomacy, display or use of Russian 
naval force to make the Norwegians ‘back off’, 
holding of ‘war games’ in the Barents Sea 
 
Table 1: A Copenhagen School perspective on the ‘Elektron’ incident.  
 
Though somewhat fragmented, the language of what may be described as Russian 
securitizing moves during the ‘Elektron’ incident generally seems to have followed a 
classic speech act pattern. It incorporated the identification of a cluster of threats, 
some of which were claimed to be of an existential nature, and calls for emergency 
measures (see table 1). The securitizing actors’ primary source of information about 
what happened on the scene of the incident seems to have been captain Yarantsev. 
Given the position he was in at the time, it is fair to assume that he may have 
considered it to be in his interest to overstate the ‘drama’ of the situation and the 
                                                 
15 Noted by representatives of the Murmansk-based Fishing Industry Union of the North (SRPS) in 
interview with the authors, 13 September 2006. 
 danger that his vessel and crew were facing, since this could potentially enhance his 
chances of receiving assistance from the Northern Fleet and/or other Russian vessels. 
On the third day of the pursuit, he reported that he was running out of hope of getting 
help from the mainland. He stated that he ‘reserved the right’ to engage in a direct 
confrontation with his pursuers (Chizhkov, 2005). In a telephone interview with the 
Ekho Moskvy radio station in Moscow, he even said he was considering ramming the 
‘KV Tromsø’ (Nurnberg, 2005). 
 
However, in order for the securitizing moves to be successful, the securitizing actors 
had to convince audiences outside the Russian fishery complex (see table 1). The 
crucial audiences to convince appear to have been the Foreign Ministry, which has the 
primary responsibility for Russia’s foreign relations, and the ‘power ministries’, 
particularly the Defense Ministry, which controls the Navy, and the Federal Security 
Service (FSB), which controls the Border Guard Service. In the eyes of these 
audiences, the leaders of the Russian fishery complex had no authority in issues of 
national security, and all of the audiences appear to have rejected the calls for 
emergency measures such as the display or use of naval force against the Norwegian 
Coast Guard. The main concern of the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, and 
the FSB, seems to have been the maintenance of stability in the Euro-Arctic region, 
rather than the destiny of the fugitive trawler. 
 
This is not to say that the audiences rejected all views expressed by those who wanted 
to turn the ‘Elektron’ incident into a national security issue. In order to fully 
understand the dynamics of actor–audience interaction in Russia at the time of the 
incident, and the securitizing actors’ apparent lack of ‘social capital’, one needs to 
take into consideration the reorganization of the Russian fishery complex that took 
place in the post-Soviet period. In the early 1990s, the complex had a relatively 
independent position, and the State Committee for Fisheries was the federal body 
responsible for governance as well as enforcement. In the late 1990s, the 
responsibility for fishery law enforcement at sea was transferred from the Fisheries 
Committee to the Federal Border Service in an effort to fight corruption with the 
sector (Hønneland, 2006). The Committee was also deprived of much of its 
independent status and for a period subordinated to the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Throughout the 2000s, relations between the Russian fishing industry and the 
siloviki16 became strained by anti-corruption measures at the federal and regional 
levels, and by measures taken against IUU fishing in the Barents Sea.  
 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s statement that Russia had ‘never agreed to the 
parameters of the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone’ can perhaps be interpreted as a 
sign of sympathy with arguments put forth by the fishery industry. However, the 
Minister maintained that the dispute would have to be resolved through diplomatic 
channels, rather than by the use of force (Zhelenin, 2005). The latter point was 
reiterated by Navy spokesman Igor Dygalo and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, who 
affirmed that there was ‘no threat of deteriorating Russian-Norwegian relations’ over 
the incident (Konovalov, 2005). The Head of the Murmansk branch of the FSB 
Border Service, Major General Viktor Gubenko, noted that ‘we will work together 
[with Norway] to fight illegal fishing’ (O’Flynn, 2005). Interestingly, neither of the 
                                                 
16 Representatives of the ‘power ministries’, which acquired an increasingly dominant role in the 
Russian society and political life during Vladimir Putin’s two presidential terms (2000-2008).  
 key siloviki picked up the anti-Norwegian rhetoric of securitizing actors within the 
Russian fishery complex, which dominated Russian media at the time of the incident. 
 
The Russian defense and security establishment was later criticized, inter alios by 
resource economists and ‘old-school’ military officers, for not taking on a more active 
role in the protection of Russia’s economic interests at sea (see, for example, 
Kos’menko & Shiyan, 2006). Among the critics was Vice Admiral (Ret.) Eduard 
Baltin, who spoke in favor of an almost symbiotic relationship between the Russian 
Navy and the Russian fishing industry. He stated that it would be in the industry’s 
interest to contribute financially to Northern Fleet patrols to the northern fishing 
grounds (Solov’ev & Ivanov, 2005). In a November 2005 commentary, the 
independent military weekly Nezavisimoe Voyennoe Obozrenie noted that ‘rather than 
paying astronomical fines to foreign states, [Russian] fishermen should finance 
[Russian] naval sailors, who can protect their activities’ (Ibid.). Thus, instead of 
framing the ‘Elektron’ incident as an isolated case of unlawful behavior by a Russian 
fishing vessel, the ‘old-schoolers’ wanted to frame it as an interstate conflict rooted in 
the weakness of Russia’s armed forces.  
 
This brings us to the third potential explanation why the ‘Elektron’ case did not 
become a security issue – ‘conditions historically associated with the [alleged] threat.’ 
In the Copenhagen School framework, it is explicitly stated that threats do not have an 
independent existence. This distinguishes the theory from traditional security studies. 
Whether or not something is a ‘threat’ is a matter of political choice rather than 
objectively definable facts. But as Barry Buzan points out (Buzan, 1991: 134), threats 
that are specific, close in time and space, and amplified by historical circumstances, 
are more likely to become security issues than threats that are diffuse, distant in time 
and space, and historically neutral. The perceived intensity of threats is also affected 
by the perceived probability of their occurrence, and their perceived consequences. 
 
In the ‘Elektron’ case, the alleged threats (see table 1) possessed many of these 
features. The attempted arrest and subsequent pursuit of the Russian trawler was 
taking place in an area of great economic significance to Russia,17 and not far from 
the country’s northwestern coastline.18 The memory of the 2001 arrest of the 
‘Chernigov’ appears to have been present in the minds of the securitizing actors. In 
previous fishery disputes in the Svalbard Zone, Norway had shown willingness to use 
force against non-complying vessels, as in 1994, when the Norwegian Coast Guard 
vessel ‘KV Senja’ fired two non-explosive shells into the hull of the Icelandic trawler 
‘Hágangur II’. If the Norwegian Coast Guard had succeeded in taking control of the 
‘Elektron’, its captain and owner would apparently have been facing serious criminal 
charges in a Norwegian court of law. And perhaps most notably: Russia would, in the 
eyes of many, have suffered a humiliating ‘loss of face’ (Baev, 2005).  
 
On the other hand, despite Norway and Russia’s diverging interpretations of the 
Svalbard Zone’s legal status, there was no pre-history of excessive force having been 
used by the Norwegian Coast Guard against Russian trawlers in the Zone. Well aware 
                                                 
17 Approximately 25 percent of Russia’s Barents Sea quota of arctic cod, which in 2005 constituted 
213,700 metric tons, is taken in the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone. In the most busy periods, more 
than a hundred Russian trawlers may be fishing for cod, shrimp, or capelin in the Svalbard Zone.  
18 The vessel was, in accordance with international maritime law, pursued all the way to the Russian 
territorial line, i.e., through Russia’s Exclusive Economic Zone off the Kola Peninsula.  
 of Russia’s position on the issue, Norway had long pursued a strategy of ‘gentle 
enforcement’ vis-à-vis Russian vessels (Hønneland, 2003: 65). In the same manner, 
Russian fishing vessels operating in the Svalbard Zone had largely complied with 
instructions given by the Norwegian Coast Guard, with the exception of not signing 
any inspection forms.19 Enforcement measures other than oral and written warnings 
had been taken only in exceptionally grave cases of overfishing or other illegal 
activities.20  
 
At the time of the ‘Elektron’ incident, the joint management of living marine 
resources in the Barents Sea (including the Svalbard Zone) had been the subject of a 
largely successful 30-year cooperation between Norway and Russia/the Soviet Union. 
The problem of IUU fishing in the region figured centrally on the agenda of the Joint 
Fisheries Commission, established in 1975 (Regnum, 2005a). Though obviously 
wanting to promote its national economic interests in bilateral quota negotiations, 
Russian authorities were in no way pre-disposed to side with the owners and captains 
of Russian fishing vessels in cases of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in 
the Barents Sea. This was particularly the case with the FSB, which at the time of the 
incident had the prime responsibility for investigating and prosecuting cases of illegal 
fishing in Russia. Rather than accepting the claims about ‘threats’ to Russian fishing 
vessels in the Svalbard Zone, or to Russian-Norwegian relations in general, the FSB, 
the Defense Ministry, and other ‘significant audiences’ in Russia largely ‘de-
bilateralized’ the incident and joined the Norwegian side in calling attention to the 
vessel’s unlawful behavior.  
 
In the ‘Elektron’ case, security speech acts in Russia fell on stony ground because the 
securitizing actors (primarily representatives of the Russian fishery complex) were 
unable to convince the key audiences (the Foreign Ministry, the FSB/Border Service, 
and the Defense Ministry) of the existence of any existential threats. The primary 
reason for the audiences’ unison rejection of the claims put forth in the security 
speech acts appears to have been the securitizing actors’ lack of social capital. The 
representatives of the Russian fishery complex were not perceived as having any 
authority on issues of national security. Even though the securitizing moves were 
executed in accordance with the ‘rules of the act’, and even though they referred to 
objects often held to be threatening, the absence of actor–audience chemistry made it 
impossible for the speech acts to produce the desired results.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Investigating cases of ‘failed securitization’, in Russia or elsewhere, is a delicate 
balancing act. By raising the question why something did not become a security issue, 
the observer runs the risk of placing himself or herself in the position of securitizing 
actor. One of the things that distinguishes the Copenhagen School approach from so-
called critical security studies (CSS), is that the former distinguishes clearly between 
the roles of ‘observers’ and ‘advocates’ (Eriksson, 1999). Copenhagen-style security 
                                                 
19 Noted by representatives of the Fishing Industry Union of the North (SRPS) in interview with the 
authors, 13 September 2006. 
20 ‘Other illegal activities’ would include fishing without a quota, which was the reason for the arrest of 
the Icelandic vessel ‘Hágangur II’ in August 1994. This was to our knowledge the first foreign fishing 
vessel to be detained by the Norwegian Coast Guard in the Svalbard Zone. Warning shots were fired 
for the first time in 1993, to force a non-complying Faroese trawler (‘Zaandam’) to leave the Zone. 
 studies are not supposed to say what should or should not constitute a security issue, 
or determine whether issue A is a bigger security issue than issue B. Their aim is 
rather to ‘observe how others advocate’, that is, to analyze and interpret the actions of 
political actors and the extent to which they are successful in mobilizing support for 
the classification of an issue as an existential threat requiring ‘emergency measures’.  
 
The methodological challenge, seen from the perspective of a Copenhagen-type 
‘observer’, is that one’s selection of cases, as well as the singling out of particular 
sectors within which to look for instances of securitization, can be interpreted as 
attempts to draw attention to the potential ‘securityness’ of particular issues or 
sectors. This type of criticism has been responded to by the Copenhagen School 
(Wæver, 1999), but it needs to be reiterated that according to the theory, it is not the 
task of security analysts to determine if something is ‘really’ a security problem. 
Thus, by calling attention to the failed efforts by some actors in Russia to turn the 
‘Elektron’ incident into a security issue, we do not mean to imply that it was ‘really’ a 
security issue, or that the issue ‘should have been’ securitized.  
 
One of the main lessons that can be learned from the ‘Elektron’ incident is that ‘non-
securitization’ can be an effective way of dealing with interstate disputes. By resisting 
the temptation to frame the episode as a security issue, the involved parties managed 
to keep it at the ‘politicized’ level, where the situation was successfully resolved 
through negotiations and dialogue. The involved vessels and their crews could return 
safely to their home ports, and the bilateral relationship between Norway and Russia 
suffered no permanent damage. The Commander of the Norwegian Coast Guard at the 
time, Commodore Geir Osen, even described the two countries’ way of dealing with 
the episode as a testimony to the quality of the bilateral relationship (Risa 2007).  
 
To some extent, the Russian strategy of ‘non-securitization’ in October 2005 appears 
to have been contingent upon a similar approach from the Norwegian side. Three 
aspects of Norway’s conduct seem to have been particularly important in terms of 
contributing to an unfavorable climate for securitization of the issue in Russia: First, 
the non-use of excessive force by the Norwegian military; second, the insistence that 
it was an isolated dispute between the Norwegian Coast Guard and a Russian trawler, 
rather than between the two countries; and third, the efforts to ‘criminalize’ the issue 
and draw attention to the underlying, joint problem of IUU fishing in the Barents Sea. 
 
With regard to the first point, it can be argued that the Russian reaction could – and 
probably would – have been different if the Norwegian Coast Guard had been more 
heavy-handed in its use of force against the ‘Elektron’. If, for example, the ‘KV 
Tromsø’ had opened fire at the trawler, the likelihood of a Russian counter-reaction 
would certainly have increased. Similarly, if Norway had undertaken a Special Forces 
operation aimed at taking over the vessel from the air, the climate for securitization of 
the issue in Russia would probably have been far more favorable, particularly if 
footage of such an operation had been shown on Russian television.21 After the 
episode, questions were raised in Norway as to why the Coast Guard had failed to 
stop the vessel, and whether Norway’s reluctance to use more force against it had 
been politically motivated. The latter claim was denied by the Norwegian Ministry of 
                                                 
21 This point relates to the potential role of images in securitization processes (cf. Williams, 2003; 
Hansen, 2007; McDonald, 2008). 
 Defense, which stated that the decision had been made at the tactical level, and that 
the safety of the vessels and their crews had been the main priority during the pursuit. 
 
The second point – Norway’s framing of the pursuit as a something else than an 
interstate dispute – apparently also contributed to its ‘non-securitization’ in Russia. 
By stating strongly and clearly that Norway’s mobilization of resources in the 
Svalbard Zone (four Coast Guard vessels, two helicopters, and a patrol plane) was 
directed against a vessel, rather than against a country, Norwegian Foreign Minister 
Jonas Gahr Støre managed to isolate the incident and make it difficult for those in 
Russia who wanted to ’bilateralize’ it and present it as part of a general ‘pattern’.   
 
Thirdly, by emphasizing the ‘law enforcement’ dimension of the pursuit, and largely 
winning acceptance for its relevance among key decision-makers in Russia such as 
the FSB and the Defense Ministry, Norway contributed to the creation of a situation 
in which the Russian security and defense establishment could reject securitizing 
moves by drawing attention to the ‘non-military’ nature of the issue. The extensive 
bilateral dialogue that took place on political and military levels at the time of the 
pursuit contributed to forestalling potential misunderstandings and misinterpretations 
that could otherwise have led to an escalation of the incident. The two countries’ way 
of dealing with the incident demonstrated in all clarity that ‘judicialization’ can 
sometimes be a good alternative to securitization. 
 
As this study has shown, security speech acts do not always lead to securitization. Not 
all actors have the ability to make socially effective claims about the existence of 
threats. The fate of securitizing moves is to a large degree determined by external 
factors such as their embeddedness, or lack thereof, in social relations of power. And 
even actors closely associated with the corridors of power (such as parliamentarians) 
can have a hard time winning acceptance for their claims that someone or something 
is threatened, and that emergency measures are warranted. Security agenda-setting 
can be a highly competitive process, and the dynamics at the intrastate level are often 
influenced by the dynamics at the interstate level. In interstate disputes, one party’s 
securitization is often followed by a ‘counter-securitization’ by the other party. 
Conversely, one party’s toning down of the security dimension of a dispute can make 
it easier for the other party to do the same. This can improve the dispute’s prospects 
of being handled in a pragmatic manner within the sphere of ‘normal’ politics. 
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